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TOC AS A GROWING THREAT TO REGIONAL, GLOBAL SECURITY
Marcus Allen Boyd & Samuel Henkin

T

ransnational organized crime (TOC) is a significant
and growing threat to the security of the United States
and a major security challenge in other critical regions of
the world. TOC continues to expand dramatically in size,
scope, and influence with major destabilizing effects. In
recent years, TOC entities have embraced new, and often
violent, practices and advanced strategies to circumvent
the traditional norms of legal economies and evade security interventions often operating through a vast economic system of dark networks and economies—illicit
and illegal sourcing, labor inputs, production, products
and services, supply chains, and consumer operations.1
Within these clandestine systems, TOC entities are expanding their operations, diversifying their activities, as
well as exploiting the increased blurring between illicit
and licit activities. The rapid evolution of TOC entities
in the past 15 years has engendered a more convoluted,
violent, and destabilizing convergence of threat vectors
challenging security regimes in detecting, disrupting,
and dismantling the (il)licit and (il)legal of transnational
criminal enterprises.

The shadow economy consists of two different economies: The illicit economy and the illegal economy. The
illicit economy is akin to the informal economy, that is,
activities that are largely legal—selling food and other goods. These activities become illicit when they are
done “extra-institutionally;” meaning the proceeds are
not taxed and are not “recorded” by the government,
or the proper permits and other bureaucratic operating requirements are not met. None of these activities
are captured in national GDP estimates.4 Conversely,
the illegal economy consists of productive activities
that run counter to domestic and/or international law.
Some illegal productive activities (e.g., production of
narcotics and drugs) are profitable enough to indirectly impact GDP, while others typically do not.

The typical consumer only ever experiences the point
of sale for the illicit/illegal good. They do not see the
hierarchical structures and transnational trade that
undergirds their purchase. The shadow economy, as
Medina and Schneider notes, goes by many names and,
depending on how it is defined, represents a significant
share of global GDP. For example, among 158 states
the average size of a state’s shadow economy relative
to their GDP was 31.9% between 1991 and 20152. By
some estimates revenues generated by transnational
crime are estimated to be worth as much as $2.2 trillion annually3. This, of course, does not account for
the countless other goods and services illicitly and/or
illegally produced and purchased around the world not
captured in estimates.

TOC entities thrive in the shadow economy because
they are institutionally adept at navigating between
the (il)licit and the (il)legal. In a recent radio interview, sociologist Federico Varese who primarily focuses on Mafia hierarchy, suggested that TOC entities
are three conjoined entities: 1) producers of goods
and services; 2) traffickers of the goods; and 3) overall TOC governance actors.5 TOC governance exists to
unify existing shadow economy structures in a similar
fashion as a corporation would vertically integrate its
supply chain. More specifically, TOC entities in Latin
America have become polycrime entities,6 embracing
multiple types and forms of criminality. Increasingly,
TOC entities are structured in such a way to encourage
polycrime activity. This is particularly relevant to narcotraffickers, but is also applicable to other criminal
entities for whom narcotics production, trafficking,
and/or distribution are not their primary type of activity.7 These entities now have decades of experience
in illicit and illegal practices that benefit multiple different types of transnational criminal activity. With
transnational networks in place, weapons trafficking, human trafficking and/or smuggling, intellectual
property crime, counterfeit products, and counterfeit
drugs all become viable productive activities.8

In this piece, we will demonstrate the general hierarchical structure of TOC entities that promulgate a significant proportion of the shadow economy and, in turn,
how the existing legitimate economic structures make
TOC entity activities profitable and difficult to curtail. At
their core, TOCs are driven by market forces and opportunity, and they seek to maximize and sustain profits,
similar to licit businesses. Yet while TOC entities operate like other legitimate businesses, albeit with (il)legal/
(il)licit goods and services, they actively work to circumvent, evade, and ignore economic norms exercising corrupt, exploitative, and violent means to perpetuate their
profit maximization.

We suggest that there is a fourth role within TOC entities: the “violence worker.” Violence workers are those
members of TOC entities that use violence to enforce
(bureaucratic) order. Violence workers appear organically, and become specialized, in the ranks of producers, traffickers, and governors, and work to reinforce
TOC goals through the use of violence. The “order-enforcement” exercised by violence workers functions as
a determined logic of coercion and violence aimed to
define the extent of TOC governance.9 Significantly,
order-enforcement requires a substantial balancing
act so that the fear constituted by TOC vio lence workers creates economic opportunities without fully dele-

The Shadow Economy of Transnational
Organized Crime

VOLUME 2 | JANUARY 2022

Page 32

TOC AS A GROWING THREAT TO REGIONAL, GLOBAL SECURITY
gitimizing their standing, especially those that blend
illicit and licit activities, or draws significant attention
from state interventionary forces.10 In other words, violence workers employ order-enforcement to normalize TOC entities’ claims of legitimacy to govern and
operate across their territories. As TOC entities grow
and diversify, violence workers have become more indispensable.
For some organized criminal entities, violence workers mainly serve a productive role, meaning that they
manage “strong arm” activities like extortion, protection rackets, burglaries, and robberies. In more
sophisticated polycrime transnational organized
criminal entities, violence workers commit similar
activities, and involve violence specialization, like
firefights (tiroteos), assassinations (asesinatos), and
raids (incursiónes) at varying levels of intensity and
tactical action, to ensure successful trafficking operations.11 The economic gains from rudimentary violence work are rather insignificant compared with the
funds received from successful trafficking operations.
Moreover, varying levels and intensity of violence
maintained by violence workers across all scales of
TOC activity engenders a “criminal governance” that
functions in opposition to and often in collusion with
the state’s capacity to govern, occupying an occluded
space between everyday criminal (bureaucratic) activity and violent conflict.12
Borrowing from Mancur Olson’s work, violence workers who support TOC entities are disinclined from
participating in what Olson termed “roving banditry”
because as “stationary bandits,” they are economically successful and not raising the ire of state entities
that could counter their efforts. However, when states
flex their muscles and challenge TOC sovereignty,
it incentivizes violence workers to organize against
state forces and civilian populations to maintain the
entity’s existing business practices. Even though violence workers are indispensable to TOC entities in
stimulating and maintaining illicit practices, (semi-)
legitimate economic structures and individuals, socalled “facilitators”, make TOC activities even more
profitable by crossing the between the shadow economy and global economy to serve legitimate customers
and TOC entities alike.13 Facilitators serve wittingly,
and sometimes unwittingly, to connect TOC entities
to legitimate economic structures, like offshore bank
accounts and shell corporations, in order to sustain
growing polycrime infrastructures. Violence workers
and facilitators both function to advance perpetuation
of TOC activities and their profitability underpinning
the foundations of the shadow economy.
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Recent TOC Trends
In the past, TOC entities largely remained regional in
their operational scope with strict hierarchical structures. Today, TOC entities are more variable and volatile embracing new, and often violent, operational strategies increasing not only their diversification of illicit
activities, but also, the density of those illicit activities.
Additionally, TOC entities increasingly engage in illicit
activities that transgress territories and borders of a single state. This expansion poses serious threats to neighboring states and their citizens, generating both direct
and indirect economic harm, affecting social structures,
like public health, and hindering the development and
stability of states.14 Notable trends in TOC that present
significant challenges today include:
1.

Fragmentation: TOC fragmentation has led to increasingly adaptable, agile, and competitively violent criminal organizations with varying structures
and wider networks.

2. Geographical expansion: TOC expansion has led to
greater contestation over illicit inputs, routes, and
markets globally.
3. Diversification: TOC entities are diversifying their
criminal portfolios, thus increasing their criminal
density, seeking greater profits, consolidation of
markets, and safeguarded supply chains.
4. Legitimate entanglement: TOC entities are becoming increasingly entangled with legitimate businesses and actors, including state actors (e.g., corrupt
security force personnel), and especially, banking
institutions to launder money.
5.

Specialization: TOC entities pursue cross-national
specialization, forging networked criminal connections at regional and global scales.

6. Virtual: There is an increasing role of cyber capabilities in TOC as TOC entities exploit online dark networks (i.e., the dark web) and licit online economic
platforms, to sell goods and services.
The most indelible issues we face when countering TOC
involve the metastasizing and merging of regional entities into global juggernauts. The initial Medellín and Cali
cartels were transnational because they produced their
goods in Colombia and Bolivia and they were transported to, and sold in, the United States. Yet we have seen
subsequent Mexican cartels— Sinaloa and Loz Zetas, for
example—expand their reach globally partnering with
European, Asian, Australian, and African organized
criminal entities to reshape the drug trade.15 This has
been evident most recently in the mixing of Mexican
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and European assets to produce highly refined crystal
meth that has taken over the European recreational
drug scene. In late 2020, police raids in The Netherlands
discovered a professional crystal meth lab that was truly global: Mexicans cooked the meth using Dutch-made
equipment and chemicals sourced from China. The recent raids have uncovered links to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the newer and most violent Mexican cartels.16 CJNG and the Sinaloa cartel have
also been linked to the recent proliferation of fentanyl
that has fueled the opioid epidemic in the United States
over the last few years.17 Cartels send envoys to China
to purchase dual use precursor chemicals and/or bulk
shipments of fentanyl, and then ship those to Mexican
ports, like Lázaro Cardenas, where cartel members take
possession of the material for further processing, trafficking, and then vending.18 These methods, at the current economy of scale, make these operations incredibly
profitable. The profitability and global nature have led to
increases in violence brought about by difficulties managing the hierarchy across global space in addition to the
opportunity to earn profit at all levels.
Conclusion
These characteristics of TOC entities—the increasingly
global scope of their reach, the institutionalization of
violence, and the fine line between illicit and illegal—
have profound implications for the global economy.
The implications of the capacity and capabilities to
counter TOC profoundly shape if, when, and how these
current and emerging trends continue to produce violent and destabilizing consequences. The growth in
criminal density and geographical expansion of TOC
entities across various regions in the world, including
the U.S. Southern Border, will only continue to produce instability. As TOC entities form more sophisticated networks and means of transnational operation,
it is necessary to consider ways to enhance data collection, analysis, and information sharing capabilities
across states to keep pace with the rapidly changing dynamics of TOC activities, and to address gaps in policy
and practice to counter TOC.
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